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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
EXCELSIOR IRON MINING COMPANY, 
a corporation, and UTAH CONSTRUC-
TION COMPANY, a corporation, 
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vs. 
CLARENCE I. JUSTHEIM and ROBERT 
GORLINSKI, 
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EXCELSIOR IRON MINING COMPANY, 
a corporation, and UTAH CONSTRUC-
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Case No. 
7825 
KEPLY BKIEF OF DEFENDANTS AND 
APPELLANTS 
I, 
THE JONES PATENT DID NOT GRANT THE 
ENTIRE CORA No. 1 LODE BUT SPECIFICALLY 
EXCLUDED THE PART THEREOF CONTAINED 
WITHIN THE CONFLICT AREA. 
It is manifest that the critical issue in this case 
involves the construction and interpretation of the Jones 
1 
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Patent. Defendants and Appellants in their opening 
brief discussed this issue under Point III at pages 33, 
et seq. Plaintiffs and Appellees set forth their position 
in their brief under point A-7 at page 25, et seq. Counsel 
for Plaintiffs and Appellees "skeletonize" the pertinent 
language in the patent and seek to demonstrate that 
the concluding clause of the exception, viz: 
"and also that portion of said Cora No. 1 vein 
or lode, and of all veins, lodes and ledges through-
out their entire depth, the tops or apexes of 
which lie inside of such excluded ground" 
operates as a grant rather than as an exclusion. Oppo-
sitely, Defendants and Appellants assert that this clause 
when properly related to the other provisions of the 
patent operates as an exclusion from the grant of that 
portion of the Cora No. 1 vein or lode which is situate 
in the conflict area. 
There is no apex of the Cora No. 1 vein or lode 
within the non-excluded ground of the description. The 
testimony of the engineers and geologists, Hanson and 
Christensen (who were plaintiff's experts), proves there 
is no apex of the vein within such ground. The testimony 
of Dr. Hanson on this point is set forth on pages 42 to 
48 in Defendants' and Appellants' opening brief. Dr. 
Christensen, at pages 53, 54, 55 and 56 of Defendants' 
and Appellants' opening brief, clearly demonstrates that 
this mineral deposit possesses no apex. The grant to 
Jones therefore carried with it no extralateral rights. 
The authorities cited in the opening brief of Defendants 
and Appellants sustain the proposition that it is the 
2 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
existence of an apex within a granted area that carries 
extralateral rights. If the apex of the vein is not within 
the granted area the patentee acquires no title to the 
deposit exterior to the side and end lines of the grant. 
Therefore, Defendants and Appellants cannot rely upon 
the doctrine of extralateral rights and it must be excluded 
from consideration. 
In construing and interpreting the exceptions and 
exclusions in the Jones patent (the portion of the patent 
in controversy is set forth at page 4 of Defendants' and 
Appellants' opening brief and at pages 26 and 27 of the 
brief of Plaintiffs and Appellees), consideration must 
be given to several elements entering into the form of 
the exception and exclusion clause. 
1. The element of punctuation is an important 
consideration. 
The Cora No. 1 lode claim is specifically described 
by metes and bounds. The description has eight courses 
and eight corners. That portion of the Cora No. 1 
embraced within Lot 48 or the Little Allie Claim and 
that portion situate in the Southwest Quarter of the 
Northwest Quarter of Section 32 (except Tract A, which 
is described by metes and bounds) are obviously excluded 
from the grant. Attention is invited to the placement 
of a semi-colon following the terminal words of the 
description of Tract A being the words "to the place of 
beginning." According to Funk and Wagnall's standard 
dictionary a semi-colon is "A mark of grammatical punc-
tuation used in English to indicate a separation in the 
relations of the thought a degree greater than that 
3 
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expressed by the comma." According to the same dic-
tionary, a comma is "A rhetorical punctuation mark (,) 
indicating the slightest possible separation in ideas and 
construction." The draftsman excluded that part of Cora 
No. 1 situate in the Southwest Quarter of the Northwest 
Quarter of Section 32 and then from this exclusion 
excepted Tract A describing it by metes and bounds and 
then placed a semi-colon at the end of the description 
of Tract A. He placed a semi-colon in the position indi-
cated because he had completed the description of the 
area which was excepted from the broad exclusion of 
the area within the Southwest Quarter of the Northwest 
Quarter of Section 32. By the placement of a semi-colon 
in this position he definitely indicated a separation of 
thought. He had concluded his idea concerning the land 
(which was Tract A) to be saved to the patentee from 
the general exclusion. He was then prepared to go for-
ward with another thought. He then introduced an idea 
entirely alien to Tract A and there follows the clause 
"and also that portion of said Cora No. 1 vein or lode, 
and of all veins, lodes and ledges throughout their entire 
depth, the tops or apexes of which lie inside of such 
excluded ground." This thought certainly has no con-
nection with the description of the land to be saved from 
the general exclusion (Tract A) and the use of the semi-
colon was the proper metliod of indicating that the 
draftsman was introducing a new thought which relates 
back to the primary exclusion of the patent and refers 
to the general exception and exclusion pertaining to Lot 
48 and the Southwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter 
of Section 32. Read in this manner the patent excepts 
4 
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and excludes from the grant all that portion of the 
ground of Cora No. 1 embraced in: 
(a) Lot 48 or Little Allie Claim, and 
(b) Southwest Quarter of the Northwest Quar-
ter of Section 32 except Tract A, and 
(c) All that portion of Cora No. 1 vein or lode 
and of all veins, lodes and ledges, the tops 
or apexes of which lie inside of such ex-
cluded ground. 
2. The granting clause of the Jones patent 
confirms Defendants' and Appellants' construction* 
The granting clause of the Jones patent reads as 
follows: 
"Now know ye, that there is therefore, pur-
suant to the laws aforesaid, hereby granted by 
the United States unto the said grantee and to 
the heirs or successors and assigns of said 
grantee, the said mining premises hereinbefore 
described and not expressly accepted (excepted) 
from these presents, and all that portion of the 
said vein, lode or ledge, and all other veins, lodes 
and ledges through their entire depth, the tops 
or apexes of which lie inside of the surface 
boundary lines of said granted premises in said 
survey extending downward vertically, although 
such veins, lodes or ledges to (in) their downward 
course may so far depart from the perpendicular 
as to extend outside the vertical side lines of said 
premises * * *." 
For convenience there is below shown in parallel 
columns the relevant parts of the definitive description 
of the patent and also of the granting clause thereof: 
5 
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DEFINITIVE DESCRIPTION 
GRANTING CLAUSE OF 
JONES PATENT 
"and also all that portion "the said mining premises 
of said Cora No. 1 vein or hereinbefore described and 
lode, and of all veins, lodes not e x p r e s s l y accepted 
and ledges, t h r o u g h o u t (excepted) from these pre-
their entire depth, the tops sents, and all that portion 
or apexes of which lie of the said vein, lode or 
inside of such excluded ledge and all other veins, 
ground * * *." (Emphasis lodes and ledges through 
supplied). their entire depth, the tops 
• - . .. or apexes of which lie in-
side of the surface bounda-
ry lines of said granted 
premises in said survey, 
etc. * * *." (Emphasis sup-
plied). 
The provisions of the granting clause are consistent 
with the requirements of R.S. 2322 (U.S.C.A. Title 30, 
Section 26). There is a grant of extralateral rights based 
on the statutory mandate. If the non-excluded area of 
Cora No. 1 (delineated in blue on plat in opening brief 
of Defendants and Appellants) had contained the apex 
or top of the vein this grant would have carried with it 
all "veins, lodes and ledges throughout their entire 
depth'* * * although such veins, lodes and ledges may so 
far depart from the perpendicular in their coarse down-
ward as to extend outside the vertical sidelines of such 
surface locations." Stated otherwise, if said non-excluded 
area contained the apex of a vein the grantee would be 
entitled to follow the vein on its dip although it extended 
t> 
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outside the vertical sidelines of the survey location. 
(R.S. 2322 is set forth verbatim on pages 62 and 63 of 
opening brief of Defendants and Appellants). 
When the granting clause is compared with the 
definitive description of the patent an anomalous situa-
tion is provoked if the interpretation and construction 
of the definitive description advocated by Plaintiffs and 
Appellees is adopted. As has been demonstrated the 
granting clause conveyed all that portion of the veins 
which may have their apexes within the non-excluded 
area and according to Plaintiffs and Appellees it also 
conveyed the portion of Cora No. 1 vein and of all veins 
the tops or apexes of which lie inside of such excluded 
ground. The result of this construction is that Jones 
was granted not only the portions of veins or lodes having 
their apexes in the non-excluded ground but also all 
veins which have their apexes within the area which was 
specifically excluded. I t is submitted that no such con-
veyance was intended as such interpretation vested in 
the patentee greater rights than the statute permitted. 
Under the doctrine of Montana Ore-Purchasing Co. v. 
Boston & M. Consol. Copper and Silver Min. Co. (20 
Mont. 336; 51 Pac. 159) and State v. District Court (25 
Mont. 504, 572; 65 Pac. 1020) cited at pages 74-78 of 
the opening brief of Defendants and Appellants, the 
grant of all veins, lodes and ledges the tops or apexes 
of which lie inside of such excluded ground would be void. 
The construction and interpretation of the definitive 
description asserted by Defendants and Appellants rec-
onciles completely with the provisions of the granting 
7 
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clause. In this light, the granting clause confirmed 
Jones' extralateral rights in and to all veins which had 
their tops or apexes within the non-excluded ground but 
in order to prevent any ambiguity arising as to the extent 
of the grant the draftsman took the precaution of exclud-
ing all that portion of Cora No. 1 vein or lode and of all 
veins, lodes and ledges the tops or apexes of which lie 
inside such excluded ground. The excluded ground was 
Lot 48 and the conflict area except Tract A. 
I t should be noted that the part of the definitive de-
scription above set forth in column parallel to the grant-
ing clause consists of two parts as follows: (a) the por-
tion of Cora No. 1 vein or lode which lies inside of the 
excluded ground; and (b) all veins, lodes and ledges 
the tops or apexes of which lie inside of such excluded 
ground. 
If the construction of the definitive description ad-
vocated by Plaintiffs and Appellees is adopted the results 
are also incongruous. By this interpretation the portion 
of the Cora No. 1 vein or lode which lies inside of the ex-
cluded ground and also all veins, lodes and ledges the 
tops or apexes of which lie inside of such excluded ground 
were patented to Jones. The two constituent elements 
of the grant are coupled together in the definitive descrip-
tion. As has been demonstrated above the conveyance 
of all veins, lodes and ledges the tops or apexes of which 
lie inside the excluded ground is in opposition to KS 
2322 (U.S.C.A. Title 30, Sec. 26). According to Defend-
ants' and Appellants' contention the same is void. In 
8 
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interpreting the definitive description it is impossible 
to separate this void grant from the grant covering the 
portion of Cora No. 1 vein which lies inside of the ex-
cluded ground. (Cf. Browne vs. Weave, 348 Mo. 135, 152 
S.W. (2d) 649,136 A.L.K. 286, 295). 
The construction supported by Plaintiffs and Appel-
lees requires the void element to be ignored. It is sub-
mitted that such method of interpretation violates estab-
lished rules of construction. It was certainly not the 
intention of the draftsman to convey veins, lodes and 
ledges the tops or apexes of which lie inside of the ex-
cluded ground when such grant would be in deroga-
tion of the statute and since the portion of the clause 
referring to Cora No. 1 vein or lode is coupled with 
reference to the veins, lodes or ledges the tops or apexes 
of which lie inside of the excluded ground it is impossible 
to believe that a grant was intended by the definitive 
description. Eather this situation points to the validity 
of the interpretation of Defendants and Appellants which 
is that the definitive description is an exclusion and not a 
grant. 
3. The Area Computation of the Patent Must 
Be Considered. 
Eeference is made to the plat inserted in the opening 
brief of Defendants' and Appellants' wherein are shown 
the areas described in the Jones patent. For convenience 
there is here repeated the tabulation as to the acreage 
described in the patent: 
9 
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Cora No. 1 Lode-Total Area 
. , as Located 16.157 acres 
Less Conflict with Lot 
No. 48, Little Allie Lode 5.002 Acres 
Less Conflict with Arm-
strong Placer 1.571 Acres 
Total Conflict 6.573 Acres 
Balance 9.584 Acres 
Plus Area of Tract "A" 0.141 Acres 
Total Area of Cora No. 1 
Amended Lode Patent 9.725 Acres 
This computation makes obvious that the conflict 
area (except Tract A) was excluded. 
Defendants and Appellants take cognizance of the 
argument of Plaintiffs and Appellees to destroy the effect 
of this situation. In commenting on Point V of Defend-
ants ' and Appellants' opening brief counsel for Plain-
tiffs and Appellees declare: 
"In Point V appellants ignore the controlling 
fact that we are here concerned with a lode claim 
within a prior placer." (Page 39 Plaintiffs' and 
Appellees' brief.) 
I t is manifest that Plaintiffs and Appellees recognize 
that the Jones patent excluded the conflict area (except 
Tract A) but assert that thp exclusion pertains to surface 
rights only and not to the portion of the Cora No. 1 lode 
within the conflict area (except Tract A). They assert 
that because of the operation of R.S. 2333 (U.S.C.A. Title 
10 
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30 Sec. 37) Jones received title to the surface of Tract 
A (being a fifty foot strip) and all of the Cora No. 1 lode 
within the conflict area and that their position is sup-
ported by the decision in ML Rosa Mining, Milling and 
Land Company v. Palmer, 26 Colo. 56, 56 Pac. 176. I t 
is declared in their brief that the Mt. Eosa case "con-
tinues to be the only decision by a court of last resort 
upon the precise point here involved, * * *" 
There is a sharp distinction between the facts in the 
Mt. Rosa case and the case at bar. In the Mt. Rosa case 
Mt. Eosa Company owned a patented placer claim within 
which were known lodes at the time of application for 
patent for the placer. The application failed to mention 
these lodes or apply for patent to same. Under the 
statute the applicant in the Mt. Rosa case therefore de-
clared that it had no right of possession to these known 
veins or lodes (E.S. 2333). In the instant case there was 
knowledge by the applicants for the Armstrong placer 
patent of the existence of the lode called the "Armstrong 
Iron Mine" but they failed to describe the part of the 
lode within the conflict area. They, therefore, also de-
clared that they had no right of possession of that part 
of the lode within the conflict area. So far, the facts 
of the Mt. Rosa case and the instant case parallel. 
In the Mt. Rosa case Palmer's grantors on March 
IS and April 5, 1892 entered upon land included within 
the exterior boundaries of the Mt. Eosa placer and locat-
ed the two lode claims therein. On November 7, 1892, 
the Mt. Eosa Company made application for the Mt. 
11 
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Rosa placer claim, making no mention of the lode claims, 
and on April 24, 1893, the patent therefor issued. The 
ground described in said lode mining claims was excepted 
out of the land described in and conveyed by the placer 
patent. At the time of trial the lode claims had not been 
patented. In the instant case Walker and Blair received 
their patent to the Armstrong placer on December 16, 
1879, which patent included the part of the Armstrong 
Iron Mine as therein specifically described, which descrip-
tion excluded the part thereof in the conflict area, On 
August 26, 1912, Jones became the owner of Cora No. 1 
mining claim under patent of that date. In the instant 
case, therefore, the lode claimant had received a patent 
specifically describing his grant and it is this Jones 
patent which controls the present situation. In the Mt. 
Rosa case the lode claimant had received no patent and 
the case was, therefore, decided upon the basis of the 
Mt. Eosa placer patent (which specifically excluded the 
lode claims) and the grantee of the locators of the 
unpatented lode claims. There did not intervene in that 
case a patent to the lode claims which defined the rights 
of the lode claimants. In the instant case there is the 
Jones patent which definitely sets forth the extent of 
the grant to Jones. The terms of the Jones patent cuts 
across the factual field and distinguishes the instant 
case from the Mt. Rosa case, and makes the rule of that 
decision inapplicable to the instant case. The Land 
Department of the Federal Government by the issuance 
of the Jones patent conclusively and particularly defined 
the land and mineral rights conveyed. It possessed 
12 
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full authority to specify in the patent the rights of Jones 
under the patent and this it did by process of grants 
and exclusions. I t finally concluded by describing the 
area patented to Jones as 9.725 acres which corresponds 
with the Cora No. 1 amended application for patent 
after the excluded areas are subtracted. This fact bears 
heavily upon the construction and interpretation of the 
patent. I t can be rightfully asked, why the patent de-
clares the area conveyed to be 9.725 acres if the mineral 
deposit within the conflict area was included in the 
grant? 
The definitive description contains the concluding 
phrase, "the premises hereby granted, containing 9.775 
acres, more or less." The mineral deposit in the conflict 
area consisted of 1.430 acres after excluding the area of 
Tract A of 0.141 acres. As shown above, the figure of 
9.775 acres does not include these 1.430 acres, although 
it does include the area of Tract A. There is also 
included in the total of 9.775 acres the acreage of Cora 
No. 1 claim situate in the Northwest quarter of the 
Southwest quarter of Section 32, which embraces both 
surface and sub-surface rights. I t is the "premises here-
by granted" which contains a total acreage of 9.775 
acres; not the surface area only. According to the inter-
pretation of Plaintiffs and Appellees, the part of the 
mineral deposit in the conflict area consisting of 1.430 
acres was also part of the "premises hereby granted," 
but the computation of the acreage as recited in the 
patent does not include this area of 1.430 acres. These 
13 
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facts show that the draftsman, in formulating the defi-
nitive description, had definitely in mind the idea that 
both the surface and sub-surface rights or ownership 
in the conflict area (except Tract A) were excluded and 
not included in the grant. 
II. 
THE DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT JUST-
HEIM IS THE SOLE OWNER OF THE LUCKY 
CLAIMS. GORLINSKI HAS NO I N T E R E S T 
THEREIN. 
Justheim located the Lucky claims within the conflict 
area. The notices of location are in his name alone. 
(Defendants' Exhibits 6, 7 and 8, R. 225) Gorlinski 
was employed by Justheim as an engineer to make the 
locations. (R. 261) There is not a line of evidence in 
this case which controverts Gorlinski's testimony in this 
respect. As further proof of this fact, attention is invited 
to the cross-complaint of Justheim against the Plaintiffs 
and Appellees wherein he seeks to quiet title to the Lucky 
claims. In this cross-complaint he asserted sole owner-
ship in and to the claims. If he had been successful in 
the lower court, the judgment would have resulted in 
quieting title in Justheim (not Justheim and Gorlinski) 
in and to the claims against the Plaintiffs and Appellees. 
Plaintiffs and Appellees have devoted several pages 
of their brief to demonstrate that the location of the 
Lucky claims by Justheim is void under the theory that 
Gorlinski has an interest therein. The record proves 
that Justheim alone is the owner of the claims and that 
14 
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Gorlinski was only an employee of Justheim. The status 
of the "conflict area" was not a secret held by Gorlinski 
alone which he revealed to Justheim, but is a situation 
clearly shown by the public land records. Anyone inter-
ested could have easily discovered the facts by an inspec-
tion of these records. Gorlinski revealed to Justheim 
no professional secrets nor violated any confidence by 
taking employment under Justheim. It requires much 
imagination to discover any confidential relationship 
between Gorlinski and the plaintiff, Excelsior Iron Min-
ing Company. The employment of Gorlinski by the 
predecessor in title to said plaintiff had long ago ceased. 
The fact that he possessed the same information concern-
ing the conflict area as revealed by the public records did 
not deny him the right to accept Justheim's employment. 
It is submitted that if the Lucky locations are otherwise 
valid, the fact that Gorlinski did the survey work in 
connection with the same does not invalidate them. 
Gorlinski did not create this condition, nor did any 
information he possessed invest him with an interest or 
ownership in the claims. Gorlinski's relationship with 
the location of the claim is an immaterial matter in this 
case. 
III. 
JUSTHEIM WAS AUTHORIZED BY LAW TO 
ENTER UPON THE CONFLICT AREA TO MAKE 
THE LUCKY LOCATIONS. 
Eeference is made to the discussion of the Mt. Rosa 
case, supra, by Defendants and Appellants in their open-
ing brief (pages 103-113). It is unnecessary to repeat 
15 
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what was there said. I t should be carefully noted that 
the facts of the instant case bring it squarely within the 
doctrine of the Mt. Rosa case with respect to the question 
as to whether Justheim had a right to enter upon the 
Armstrong Placer in order to make his locations. If 
the Jones patent excluded the conflict area in so far as 
the mineral deposit is concerned, then that area was open 
public domain and under the doctrine in the Mt. Rosa 
case, Justheim was authorized to make his locations 
within the area of the Armstrong Placer. 
Defendants and Appellants affirm the statement 
made at pages 110 and 111 of their opening brief: 
"The evidence is clear and undisputed that 
the existence of the Armstrong 'Iron Mine' was 
well known at the time application for patent to 
the Armstrong Placer was made; otherwise the 
application would not have included a description 
of part of the iron mine and the patent to Walker 
and Blair would have made no reference to it. 
The mineral deposit manifestly was a well-known, 
notorious geological fact prior to the application 
of the Armstrong placer patent and prior to the 
issuance of the patent. The patent itself proves 
that the deposit existed and knowledge of its 
existence must be imputed conclusively to the 
patentees. They elected to secure title to a part 
of this deposit but failed to secure title to that 
par t of it within the 'conflict area,' Neither the 
patentees nor their successors in title are in a 
position to contend that that part of the mineral 
deposit within the 'conflict area' was unknown 
to the patentees." 
16 
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It is manifest that the final determination of this 
case turns upon the construction and interpretation of 
the Jones patent. If the construction urged by Defend-
ants and Appellants is correct, then that part of the 
mineral deposit within the conflict area was open public 
domain, subject to location, and under the rule laid down 
in the Mt. Rosa decision Justheim was not a trespasser 
in entering upon the Armstrong Placer to make his Lucky 
locations. 
WHEREFORE, Defendants and Appellants reaffirm 
the prayers of their opening brief and Defendant and 
Appellant Justheim submits that the District Court 
should be directed to make, enter and file its judgment 
quieting title in and to the Lucky claims in him. 
Respectfully submitted, 
FRANKLIN RITER, 
Attorney for Defendants 
and Appellants, 
Suite 312 Kearns Building, 
Salt Lake City, Utah. 
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